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Stock price crash risk: Review of the empirical literature  
 
Abstract:  
We survey the burgeoning literature on the determinants of future stock price crash risk in the 
US, as well as in countries outside the US. Stock price crash risk, a manifestation of extreme 
negative values in the distribution of firm-specific returns, has attracted considerable research 
interests. According to Jin and Myers (2006), when cash flow is lower than investors expect, 
managers hide the bad news in an effort to protect their jobs. However, when the accumulated 
bad news finally crosses a tipping point, managers release all the bad news at once, which then 
results in a stock price crash. We synthesize a vast body of literature on the determinants of crash 
risk, identify weaknesses, and offer future research opportunities. We categorize the 
determinants into: (i) financial reporting and corporate disclosures, (ii) managerial incentives and 
managerial characteristics, (iii) capital market transactions, (iv) corporate governance 
mechanisms, and (v) informal institutional mechanisms.  Despite a large body of research into 
the determinants of crash risk, very little research attention has been directed towards 
understanding the consequences of stock price crash.  
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We survey the burgeoning literature on the determinants and consequences of future stock price 
crash risk (hereafter crash risk) in the US, as well as in countries outside the US. We intend to 
synthesise a rather vast body of literature on this topic, identify weaknesses, and offer future 
research opportunities. Research on crash risk has received considerable academic interest in 
recent accounting and finance literature.1 According to Jin and Myers (2006), when cash flow is 
lower than investors expectation, managers have incentives to hide the bad news because of 
career and short-term compensation concerns. However, when the accumulated bad news finally 
crosses a tipping point, managers release all the bad news at once, which then results in a stock 
price crash.  
   Crash risk, an important feature of return distribution, has important implications for 
portfolio theories, and for asset and option-pricing models (Kim and Zhang, 2014). Sunder 
(2010) contends that, unlike risks emanating from systematic volatilities, crash risk cannot be 
mitigated through portfolio diversification. Harvey and Siddique (2000) also suggest that 
investors expect higher returns for stocks with more negative skewness, implying that 
conditional skewness is a priced risk factor. The stock market turmoil in recent years also 
indicates the significance of crash risk to investors. Thus, understanding what affects investors’ 
perceived crash risk has the potential to make a significant contribution towards protecting 
shareholder value.  
 The bulk of the recent empirical research on the determinants of crash risk follows the 
theoretical framework of Jin and Myers (2006), who argue that the existence of information 
                                                          
1 Consistent with Chen et al. (2001) we adopt a narrow perspective for defining ‘crashes’: conditional 
skewness of the firm-specific return distribution. Hence our review is outside the purview of stock market 




asymmetries between corporate insiders and external stakeholders could contribute to crash risk. 
Asymmetric information allows managers to hide bad news for an extended period in order to 
protect employment and to minimize litigation concerns (Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 2009). 
When accumulated bad news comes out at once in the market, stock prices continue to fall 
leading to a crash. However, Hong and Stein (2003) developed a model that incorporated 
heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs: one of the key drivers of stock price crash. Investor 
heterogeneity has the potential to reveal the private signals of relatively pessimistic investors. 
Observing such signals, other investors could downgrade their assessments of a firm’s prospects, 
thereby reinforcing the decline (Hong and Stein, 2003).  
 Despite a proliferation of crash risk research with time, there is very little research on the 
consequences of crash risk. This is rather surprising given that it is crucial to understand firms’ 
responses, including those of the monitors, in order to mitigate future crash risk and to protect 
shareholders’ value. We believe that empirical research on this important issue can make 
significant contributions to the literature in increasing our understanding of some of those 
responses and their ultimate success.  
  In carrying out a systematic review of the determinants and consequences of crash risk, 
we used two criteria to determine whether to include an article in the review. First we included 
the search terms “stock price crash,” “crash,” “negative skewness” and “volatility” to retrieve 
articles from EBSCOhost, Emerald, Scopus, ProQuest, Science Direct, the Wiley Online Library 
databases, and Google Scholar. Second, we skimmed through the articles initially derived to 
identify whether they tested empirically the determinants or consequences of crash risk. Our 
search procedure returned 41 published studies on the determinants and consequences of crash 
risk. We did not restrict our search to articles published in a selective list of journals. One 
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important consideration for any literature review is whether to include unpublished working 
papers along with published studies. We excluded working papers from our primary review 
because (i) the papers have not been adequately vetted by the review process; (ii) it is difficult to 
identify all working papers, thus exclusion of some of them may generate selection bias; (iii) 
unpublished papers may be subsequently published. However, to inform readers about the 
intensity of the research on the determinants of crash risk, we list a large number of working 
papers in the Appendix (a total of 27 working papers).   
 We proceed as follows. In the next Section we provide a theoretical overview of crash 
risk along with the measurement issues, and report descriptive statistics on the primary crash 
proxies reported in the surveyed studies.  In Section 3 we synthesize the literature on the 
determinants of crash risk. We categorize the determinants into five sections: (i) financial 
reporting and corporate disclosures, (ii) managerial incentives and managerial characteristics, 
(iii) capital market transactions, (iv) corporate governance mechanisms, with a particular 
emphasis on formal governance mechanisms and (v) informal institutional mechanisms. In 
Section 4 we discuss the empirical research on the consequences of crash risk. Surprisingly, there 
is very little research attention directed towards this important research question: an observation 
that motivates us to offer some future research directions. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
  
 
2. Stock price crash risk: Theory and measurement   
 
2.1 Theory of crash risk: We conceptualize crash risk to be a manifestation of extreme negative 
values in the distribution of firm-specific returns, after adjusting for the return portions that co-
move with common factors (Jin and Myers, 2006; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a,b). Crash risk, a 
third moment of stock returns capturing negative skewness, is distinct from other measures 
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studied in prior research, such as the average return (first moments), and the variance of stock 
returns (the second moments). Early research on the higher moments of stock returns developed 
models of expected returns that incorporate skewness (Rubinstein,1973; Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1976, 1983). These models predict that higher moments relevant for individual securities co-
move with the aggregate market portfolio. More recent empirical work provides evidence that 
higher moments of the return distribution are priced in the market (Conrad, Dittmar, and 
Ghysels, 2013).  
 The bulk of the research on the determinants of crash risk follows the theoretical 
framework proposed by Jin and Myers (2006), who argue that information asymmetry between 
corporate insiders and outsiders could be related to crash risk (an agency perspective). 
Conceptually, crash risk is based on the argument that managers have a tendency to withhold bad 
news for an extended period, allowing bad news to stockpile. If managers successfully block the 
flow of negative information into the stock market, the distribution of stock returns should be 
asymmetric (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). While the natural 
arrival process of new information should not be systematically different between good and bad 
news, managerial incentives for hoarding bad news can make bad news lumpier than good news. 
When the accumulation of bad news passes a threshold, it is revealed to the market at once, 
leading to a large negative drop in stock price (Jin and Myers, 2006). This model, therefore, 
offers two avenues for enriching the crash risk literature: identifying managerial incentives for 
hoarding bad news, and the specific mechanism or a set of mechanisms through which such an 
objective can be accomplished. Both these, however, are challenging for researchers, as 
managerial incentives are unobservable and researchers are unable to control for many of the 
potential mechanisms for bad news hoarding. We believe that adequate consideration of these 
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challenges is crucial for a meaningful interpretation of the existing empirical findings on the 
determinants of crash risk.  
 Two other models, Bleck and Liu (2007) and Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010), 
also follow the agency-based view of crash risk. In the Bleck and Liu (2007) model, historical 
cost financial reporting allows a manager to continue with a poor investment project, thus 
receiving compensation prior to the project’s maturity. This is facilitated because of outsiders’ 
inability to assess the project’s market value until maturity. The Benmelech et al. (2010) model 
proposes that managers with equity-based contracts continue with negative NPV projects to 
maximize the value of their compensation packages. Both these models hint towards managerial 
incentives for hoarding bad news: the precursor for price crash.  Eventually, the manager has to 
disclose the bad news causing a large stock price drop. 
 Standard agency theory also argues that the existence of information asymmetry between 
managers and outside stakeholder incentivizes managers to make financial reports more opaque 
and, hence, to conceal negative information (Hutton et al., 2009). Although financial reporting 
opacity and its effect on crash risk has become the standard research approach, certain other 
mechanisms, independent of reporting quality, could also generate price crash. For example, 
investor heterogeneity has the potential to reveal the private signals of relatively pessimistic 
investors (Hong and Stein, 2003). This model begins with the observations that a group of 
investors (e.g., mutual funds) cannot short-sell stocks. Such constraints inhibit the revelation of 
negative information known to the pessimistic investors in stock prices. However, if other 
previously optimistic investors exit the market, the former group of investors may become the 
marginal buyers. Thus previously-hidden bad news surfaces, and results in a price crash.  
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 Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) propose an ‘information blockage’ model as another 
theoretical framework for explaining price crash. In this model, an upward price trend prompts 
favorably informed investors to engage in active trading. In contrast, less informed traders are 
naturally sceptical about the true nature of the signals and, hence, delay trading until the price 
drops. Price correction, therefore, is inevitable when the economic outlook becomes pessimistic 
and the less-informed marginal investors enter the market. Information blockage therefore 
generates negative returns skewness following price increases but positive skewness following 
price decreases (Zhu, 2016). Another source of crash risk is volatility feedback effects (e.g., 
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh, 1987; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992) whereby “…big price 
movements could cause investors to reassess market volatility and increase required risk premia. 
An increased risk premium reduces equilibrium prices, which reinforces the impact of bad news 
but offsets the impact of good news, thus generating negative skewness” (Hutton et al. 2009, p. 
68). 
 Finally, the default risk-based explanation for crash risk rests on the notion that firms 
with higher default risks are more likely to release extremely bad news or extremely good news, 
because they will either fail or continue as a going concern. Prior literature, used firm size and 
leverage as proxies for default risk but failed to find support for this proposition. For example, 
Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a,b) find a positive relationship between firm size and 
future crashes, which is counterintuitive, since larger firms are less exposed to bankruptcy risk 
than smaller firms (Campbell et al. 2008). One plausible explanation of this surprising finding 
could be attributed to the definition of a price crash, which requires a tail event of sufficient 
magnitude to fall in the lower 0.1 % of normal distribution (Hutton et al. 2009). As larger firms 
have lower standard deviations of returns than smaller firms, the absolute magnitude of a return 
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needed to qualify as a crash is thus lower for larger firms. Another puzzling finding from the 
above studies is the negative association between leverage and crash risk, when in reality 
leverage should be positively associated with bankruptcy risk (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi,  
2008). One potential explanation for this surprising result may be the fact that high leverage 
firms are initially under-priced by investors, thereby making it less likely that price crashes will 
follow. Consistent with this explanation, Campbell et al. (2008) show that high leverage firms 
generate higher future mean returns than low leverage firms (Zhu, 2016, p. 355).  
 This section summarizes the theoretical underpinnings of crash risk. As is evident from 
the discussion, researchers predominantly rely on the bad news hoarding argument in explaining 
crash risk. However, alternative theories need to be empirically tested as well, to ascertain the 
relative superiority of one framework over another in explaining the occurrence of stock price 
crash.   
 
2.2 Measurement of crash risk 
 
Extant literature uses three measures of firm-specific crash risk, consistent with Chen et al. 
(2001). These measures are based on the firm-specific weekly returns, estimated as the residuals 
from the market model. This ensures that crash risk measures reflect firm-specific factors rather 
than broad market movements. Specifically, the following expanded market model regression is 
the starting point:  
 )1.......(,,,,, ,2,51,4,31,22,1,   jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr    
Where r,j,τ is the return of firm j in week τ, and rm,τ is the return on the CRSP value-weighted 
market return in week τ. The lead and lag terms for the market index return is included, to allow 
for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). The firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week 
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τ (W j,τ) is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from Eq. (1) above. 
In estimating equation (1), each firm-year is required to have a certain number of weekly stock 
returns data, to alleviate the thin trading concern.  
 The first measure is a binary crash risk measure coded 1 if a firm experiences one or 
more firm-specific weekly returns falling at least 3.09 standard deviations below its mean value 
in a given year, and zero otherwise.
 
According to Hutton et al. (2009), the cut-off of 3.09 
standard deviations is chosen to generate 0.1% of the distribution. This variable is designed to 
indicate instances of rather substantial stock price drops in a week.  
The second measure of crash risk is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific 
weekly returns over the fiscal year (NCSKEW). NCSKEW is calculated by taking the negative of 
the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each year and normalizing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. Specifically, for each firm j in 
year τ, NCSKEW is calculated as: 
 
NCSKEW=     2/3,2,32/3 ))(2)(1(/)1(  jj wnnwnn ……..(2) 
 
 The third measure of crash risk is the down-to-up volatility measure (DUVOL) of the 
crash likelihood. For each firm j over a fiscal-year period τ, firm-specific weekly returns are 
separated into two groups: ‘‘down’’ weeks when the returns are below the annual mean, and 
‘‘up’’ weeks when the returns are above the annual mean. The standard deviation of firm-
specific weekly returns is calculated separately for each of these two groups. DUVOL is the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation in the ‘‘down’’ weeks to the standard 












, )1/()1(log ……………….(3) 
A higher value of DUVOL indicates greater crash risk. As suggested in Chen et al. (2001), 
DUVOL does not involve third moments and, hence, is less likely to be overly influenced by 
extreme weekly returns. 
 Kim and Zhang (2014) introduce a new measure, implied volatility smirks, as a proxy for 
perceived crash risk and validate this measure by documenting a positive association with 
financial reporting quality, and accounting restatements. The implied volatility of an option 
contract is the volatility implied by the market price of the option based on an option pricing, 
e.g., the Black–Scholes model. It is the volatility that equates the Black–Scholes formula to the 
market price of the option. Kim and Zhang (2014) defined the implied volatility smirk (IV-
SKEW) as the difference between the implied volatility of OTM puts (IVOTMP) and that of ATM 
calls (IVATMC): 
  IV-SKEW= IVOTMP- IVATMC………………………………….(4) 
 
Where, OTM puts are defined as put options with a delta value between -0.375 and -0.125 and 
ATM calls are defined as call options with a delta value between 0.375 and 0.625. To obtain an 
annual measure of the volatility smirk, they average the daily IV-SKEW over the 12-month 
period ending three months after the fiscal year-end. 
 Table 1 provides the descriptive values of the primary crash proxies, and the variation of 
those values across studies retrieved from the descriptive statistics section of the respective 
papers. We also report the main variable of interest and its sign, magnitude and the significance 
level, retrieved from the multivariate analysis Tables.   
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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3. Determinants of crash risk: Review of the extant literature  
3.1 Financial reporting, corporate disclosures, and crash risk  
3.1.1 Financial reporting quality and crash risk 
 
 
The predominant literature on the determinants of crash risk relies on the theoretical model of Jin 
and Myers (2006), which naturally required empirical validation. Hutton et al. (2009) addressed 
this by using accumulated accruals, a proxy for firm-level earnings management, to document 
that firms with more opaque financial reporting are more prone to price crash. The use of 
accruals management is justified because such manipulation allows managers to obfuscate at 
least some information about firm fundamentals. However, research has found that managers 
have switched from accruals management to real earnings management (REM) in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). If REM reflects managerial 
opportunism as does accruals management, it can be hypothesized that in the post-SOX regime, 
REM will have greater explanatory power for explaining crash than does accruals. Francis, 
Hasan and Li (2014) investigate this proposition and find that firms that engage in REM are 
prone to crash risk and, importantly, the effect is more pronounced in the post-SOX era. 
However, a value-enhancing perspective of REM finds that current-period REM improves 
subsequent performance (Gunny, 2010). Future research should consider this competing 
perspective, and identify settings where opportunism (informativeness) is better captured by 
REM actions. For example, Gunny and Zhang (2014) find that firms just meeting analyst 
forecasts, with many patent citations, have significantly better performance than their 
counterparts with relatively few patent citations. Future research might use this context and 
investigate the crash probabilities for firms that meet forecasts with few, as opposed to many, 
patent citations.  
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 Besides accruals management and REM, another earnings management tool gaining 
popularity is ‘classification shifting’ (McVay, 2006), whereby managers shift some expenses to a 
‘special item’ category to improve core earnings. However, unlike accruals and REM, this 
technique does not allow managers to withhold bad news. Nevertheless, shifting expenses to 
boost core earnings is a reflection of lack of transparency: a driver of crash risk. Future research 
should incorporate a comprehensive reporting quality proxy, including accruals management, 
REM, and classification shifting, to provide more robust evidence that financial reporting quality 
is  the primary driver  of crash risk. Although documenting an association between financial 
reporting opacity and crash risk is informative, this stream of research does not tell us much 
about the particular incentives that drive a managerial decision to withhold bad news. We now 
review the strand of research that addresses this concern.   
 
3.1.2 Executive compensation and price crash 
 
An oft-cited incentive for earnings management and, hence, asymmetric disclosure of news, is to 
maximize the incentives-based compensation. Kim et al. (2011a) investigate the relative 
contribution of CEO versus CFO equity incentives for crash risk, and find that the ratio of the 
CFO option portfolio value to stock price increases the crash risk. Since CFOs oversee the 
financial reporting process, their incentives might be more influential in a decision setting where 
sophisticated financial expertise is required to manipulate information flows to the market (Jiang, 
Petroni, and Wang, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). If blockage of negative information 
stemming from CFO incentives has adverse implications for shareholders, then why wouldn’t 
firm-level corporate governance mechanisms constrain such action? The authors considered an 
external governance mechanism, product market competition, but not internal governance tools. 
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This creates an omitted variable problem, the impact of which, based on the documented results, 
is not known. He (2015) investigates the impact of another form of compensation: CEO inside 
debt. Inside debt refers to debt in the form of pensions and deferred compensation that resembles 
debt contracts, representing a fixed obligation for a firm to make future payments to CEOs. The 
general consensus from the literature is that inside debt motivates managers to commit to high-
quality financial reporting. Consistent with this argument, He (2015) finds that inside debt 
reduces future price crash.  
 
3.1.3 Tax avoidance and crash risk 
 The aggregate earnings management proxy, however, has a limitation. This measure fails 
to document the specific methods and/or combination of methods used by managers to manage 
earnings. One such technique for managing earnings and, thereby, withholding bad news is 
corporate tax avoidance. Kim et al. (2011b) find that corporate tax avoidance increases crash 
risk, supporting the contention that aggressive tax strategies and planning provide managers with 
a means to conceal negative information, thereby increasing crash risk. However, auditor-
provided tax services constrain tax expense management and tax avoidance (knowledge spillover 
benefits), thereby reducing the propensity for crash (Habib and Hasan, 2016). However, 
Choudhary, Koester, and Pawlewicz (2015) find that tax accrual quality, a measure of financial 
reporting quality specific to the tax account, decreases in firms where incumbent auditors also 
provide tax services. An avenue for future research would be to test whether tax accrual quality 
affects crash risk, and whether auditor-provided tax services moderate the association between 





3.1.4 Accounting conservatism, financial statement comparability and readability, and 
crash risk  
 
Given the widespread use of earnings manipulation (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005) and its 
adverse effects on crash risk with direct consequences for investors, it becomes imperative to 
understand the financial reporting-related mechanisms for constraining such opportunistic 
reporting behavior and, hence, crash risk.  
 Conditional conservatism, a desirable attribute of financial reporting (Basu, 1997; Watts 
2003 a, b; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) is one such constraint. Conservatively-audited earnings 
attenuate (accelerate) managerial incentives to release positive (negative), but unverifiable, 
information. Timely disclosures of bad news reduce crash risk. Using conservative accounting 
policy that offsets managers’ tendencies to hide bad news as the informational setting, Kim and 
Zhang (2015) find that crash risk decreases for firms with more conservative accounting policies.  
 Financial statement comparability2, another desirable characteristic of financial reporting, 
has also been found to attenuate crash risk (Kim, Li, Lu and Yu, 2015). This is premised on the 
following argument:   
 “By having access to and being able to understand information from comparable firms, investors 
 can not only gain a better understanding of a firm's performance but also obtain some of the bad 
 news about it through inferences based on the performance and/or disclosures of its comparable 
 peers… Since investors may have already obtained some of the undisclosed bad news about a 
 firm by analyzing its comparable peer firms, the benefits to managers from bad news hoarding are 
 likely to be smaller…” (Kim et al., 2016, p.295).   
 
                                                          
2 An intuitive definition of comparability rests on the notion that “…the accounting system is a mapping from 
economic events to financial statements. For a given set of economic events, two firms have comparable 
accounting systems if they produce similar financial statements.” (DeFranco, Kothari, and Verdi, 2011, p. 
896). Since comparability reflects similarities in the operating environment as well as in financial reporting 
behavior with other firms, the degree of comparability is mainly determined by common economic factors and 
firm-specific factors (Zhang, 2013). While common economic factors affect firms within the same industry in 
a similar way and, thus, increase comparability, firm-specific factors, such as financial or operating 




 Although external stakeholders would benefit from more comparable financial 
information, there are also likely to be significant proprietary costs of comparability in the face 
of intense competition. This occurs because managers rely on information from their 
competitors’ financial reports as inputs to developing their competitive strategies (e.g., Bagnoli 
and Watts, 2010; Beatty, Liao, and Yu, 2013). Consequently, managers of firms operating in 
competitive industries would have incentives to lessen financial statement comparability. 
Seavey, Imhof and Watanabe (2016) find support for this proposition. It would be interesting to 
explore whether firms operating in highly competitive industries are more likely to experience 
crash risk given the supply of less comparable financial statements.   
 The information contained in the annual reports, although of paramount importance, is 
plagued with serious concerns about the readability of those reports (SEC, 1998). In terms of 
economic consequences of the less readable annual reports, Ertugrul, Lei, Qiu and Chi 
(forthcoming) find that firms with larger 10-K file sizes, and a higher proportion of uncertain and 
weak modal words in 10-Ks, are associated with greater crash risk.  
 
3.1.5 Internal control weakness and crash risk 
The extent to which the above-discussed mechanisms are effective in curbing crash risk 
depends a lot on the internal control quality level in an organization.  For example, a weak 
control environment has the potential to allow both intentional misreporting through accruals 
manipulation, and unintentional errors in accrual estimation. Taken together, firms with 
ineffective internal control, in particular, internal control over financial reporting, disseminate 
less reliable financial information (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007a, b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, LaFond, 2009; Feng, Li, and McVay, 2009): the primary driver of crash risk. Chen, 
Chan, Dong and Zhang (2016) focus on the strength of internal control of Chinese listed firms, 
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and find that high quality internal control alleviates crash risk. The quality of internal control is 
measured with a composite index evaluated on five components (i.e. control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring).3  
 Besides financial reporting-related constraining mechanisms, non-reporting mechanisms, 
e.g., corporate governance mechanisms, play a crucial role in minimizing crash risk. We discuss 
this stream of research in Section 3.7. We also believe that important insights can be gained by 
investigating firm-level strategic choices, including customer concentration, on crash risk. 
Research on the  financial reporting implications of customer concentration has revealed that 
supplier firms with a concentrated customer base manage earnings through the opportunistic use 
of accruals (Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores, 1995; Raman and Shahrur, 2008), report 
conservatively (Hui, Klasa, and Yeung, 2012), and make less frequent earnings forecasts 
(Crawford, Huang, Li, and Yang, 2016).  Since all these variables have been found to be related 
to crash risk, future research should investigate relationship-induced reporting practices on crash 
risk.  
 
3.2 Voluntary disclosures and crash risk   
 
Managers may also use voluntary disclosures opportunistically to conceal bad news for an 
extended period. However, such disclosures can also reduce information asymmetry, and lessen 
                                                          
3 Since 2006, China has been strengthening its internal control regulations. The Basic Standard, known as the 
China SOX, became effective on 1 July 2009. The Basic Standard requires listed firms to strengthen their 
internal control over the following five aspects, namely, the internal control environment, internal risk 
assessment and management, internal control activities, internal control information disclosure and 
communication, and internal control oversight (Ministry of Finance, 2008). After that, the Internal Control 
Application Guidelines issued in April 2010 provide detailed instructions on how the Basic Standard is to be 
fully implemented. As complementary regulations to strengthen internal control monitoring, the Internal 
Control Evaluation Guidelines and the Internal Control Audit Guidelines stipulate listed firm’s self-evaluation 
on their internal control effectiveness in relation to the five aspects and the responsibilities required on auditors 




the need for bad news hoarding. Corporate social responsibility disclosures (CSR) are one such 
voluntary disclosure tool. Prior empirical evidence documents that, among other benefits,  
socially responsible firms provide more and better financial disclosures (Gelb and Strawser, 
2001) and engage less in earnings management (Kim, Park and Weir, 2012). Building on this 
premise, Kim et al. (2014) reveal that firms with better CSR disclosures have a lower crash risk. 
However, they did not test some of the channels through which the beneficial effects of CSR on 
crash risk can be manifested. Zhang, Xie and Xu (forthcoming) examine the effects of corporate 
philanthropic action (a component of CSR) on crash risk in China, and find that corporate 
philanthropic action reduces crash risk. However, the negative association is less pronounced for 
SOEs, and is also less pronounced after the 2007 split share reform act.4   
  
3.3 Accounting standards and crash risk  
 
From an accounting standards perspective little research has examined the impact of accounting 
standards on crash risk. Although mandatory, accounting standards need to allow flexibilities 
and, hence, open up an avenue for inconsistent application at best, and earnings manipulation 
and reporting fraud at worst. Such flexibilities, therefore, allow managers to conceal negative 
information, particularly with the onset of a fair value-based reporting regime. DeFond, Hung, 
and Li (2015) is the only available study that investigates the impact of accounting standards on 
crash risk. They find that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has 
reduced crash risk among nonfinancial firms. This effect is more pronounced for those with large 
information asymmetry during pre IFRS adoption, and a more credible change in local GAAP 
post adoption. It is important to note that IFRSs vary, in terms of their degree of complexity and, 
hence, the opportunities for withholding bad news. Therefore, the development of a more refined 
                                                          
4 See Jiang and Habib (2012) for a background discussion on the ‘split share reform initiative in China.  
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proxy to determine firm-level variation in IFRS complexity and its impact on crash risk remains 
an open empirical question. Mergenthaler (2012) develops an instrument that measures the 
extent to which a standard contains rules-based characteristics (RBC). One may sort firms 
according to their use of the RBC, and investigate whether greater RBC leads to higher price 
crash.   
 A shortcoming of the extant empirical research relating crash risk to managerial 
opportunistic reporting incentives concerns the absence of a causal test to determine whether 
incentives lead to crash risk through the bad news hoarding channel. For example, managerial 
incentives to engage in upward earnings management due to compensation incentives are well-
documented in the literature. However, a causal test would require decomposing the effects into 
direct effects of incentives as a proportion of crash risk and indirect effect of specific channels, 
e.g., opaque reporting, as a proportion of crash risk. However, such a test is missing from the 
existing literature. To give an example, Kim et al. (2011a) included compensation proxies as the 
main variable of interest and controlled for abnormal accruals instead of interacting the two.  
 Similar arguments apply in relation to Kim et al.’s (2014) study on CSR and crash risk. 
The negative coefficient on CSR in itself does not inform readers about the bad news hoarding 
theory. It is therefore important to examine the channels through which CSR curbs bad news 
hording and crash risk.  It has also been found that CSR firms engage less in tax avoidance 
(Lanis and Richardson, 2012) and tax avoidance increases crash risk (Kim et al. 2011b), implying 
another possible moderating variable that may explain the CSR-crash relationship. It is important 
that future research provides explicit tests to isolate the direct and indirect contribution of chosen 




3.4 Managerial characteristics and crash risk  
 
Do managerial traits or styles have implications for crash risk? This line of enquiry is important 
because it is the idiosyncratic characteristics of managers that shape their decision choices 
regarding the withholding of bad news: the primary predictor of crash risk. Kim, Wang, and 
Zhang (2014) consider ‘CEO overconfidence’ as one such managerial trait, and find that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to experience stock crash. This finding is in line with the 
argument that overconfident CEOs are more likely to keep alive negative NPV projects because 
of their biased overestimation of future cash flows. An overconfident CEO also tends to ignore 
negative feedbacks originating from value-destroying negative NPV projects. The poor 
performance of these bad projects accumulates and eventually is released to the market all at 
once, leading to a stock price crash. Are overconfident managers also talented managers? 
Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, McVay (2013) reveal that more-able managers provide better quality 
earnings and, thus, should reduce the propensity for crash. However, more-able managers could 
also be overconfident and, hence, entangling these two constructs in order to infer their relative 
contribution to crash risk would be a valuable contribution to the crash literature.  
 Nonetheless, a direct association between managers and crash risk requires the 
development of a manager’s fixed effects model: tracking managers who move across firms. 
Researchers also need to incorporate firm fixed-effects to solidify the direct association between 
managers and crash risk. We encourage further research on this important ‘human dimension’ to 
explain crash risk. Moreover, like individual CEOs, individual auditors have styles (Francis, 
Pinnuck, and Watanabe, 2014). Future research may examine whether auditor fixed-effects affect 




3.5 Capital market determinants of crash risk  
 
While studies predominantly contend that stock price crash occurs when accumulated bad news 
is released all at once in the capital market, some studies document that such bad news hoarding 
may be reflected in stock trade volume and return: an observation that could provide reasonable 
indication about future price crash. For example, Chen et al. (2001) argue that trade volume 
reflects disagreement among investors and, as such, an increase in trading volume relative to 
trend over the prior six months indicates that some investors are aware of pending bad news, 
resulting in higher trading between informed and uninformed investors. They also contend that 
positive returns over the prior 36 months imply that a bubble has been building up for a long 
time, which is naturally followed by a by a large drop in stock price when prices fall back to 
fundamentals. Consistent with their argument, Chen et al. (2001) find that crash risk is more 
pronounced for stocks that experienced large trading volumes and high past returns.   
In addition, studies also show that the capital market itself provides an incentive to hoard 
bad news, which increases the likelihood of future price crash. For example, in a recent study 
Chang, Chen and Zolotoy (Fortjhcoming) use stock liquidity to proxy for such an incentive, and 
find that the probability of future crash risk increases with an increase in stock liquidity. Their 
empirical evidence is consistent with the argument that stock liquidity provides a managerial 
incentive to withhold bad news, fearing that bad news disclosures may lead transient investors to 
sell their stock.  While Chang et al. (2016) show empirically that the effect of stock liquidity on 
future crash risk is more pronounced for firms with a high proportion of transient institutional 
ownership, the extent to which stock liquidity affects crash risk directly and indirectly (through 
the transient investor channel) is not clear from their analysis. Therefore, future research may 
investigate the direct, indirect and total effect of stock liquidity on future price crash.  Callen and 
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Fang (2015), document that short interest in stocks predicts future crash risk. This is consistent 
with the view that short sellers are able to detect managerial bad news hoarding activities, 
prompting them to take short positions of stock in anticipation of price crashes.  
 
3.6 Corporate governance and crash risk  
3.6.1 Internal corporate governance mechanism and crash risk 
 
Corporate governance attributes have an important role on financial disclosure and 
reporting quality (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007). For example, Bedard, Chtourou, and 
Courteau (2004) show that the financial and governance expertise of audit committee members 
reduces aggressive earnings management. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) also provide 
consistent evidence that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial 
sophistication, have a crucial impact on constraining the managerial propensity to engage in 
earnings management. Extending these findings to crash risk, Andreou, Antoniou, Horton, and 
Louca (2016) show that a high proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, 
adequate auditor industry expertise, and a clearly-defined corporate governance policy, reduce 
the likelihood of crash.  
 Prior research on stock price crash risk in China has investigated some of the 
determinants of crash risk including excess perks in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Xu, Li, 
Yuan, and Chan (2014) report that excess perks in SOEs motivate managers to withhold bad 
news over extended periods for  personal gain, resulting in a high crash risk. Meanwhile, they 
find that low financial reporting quality, i.e., earnings management and a low level of 







3.6.2 External corporate governance mechanisms and crash risk 
 
In this section we review the role of external corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating 
crash risk. We consider institutional holding, large shareholdings, financial analysts, external 
auditing, and the director and officer liability (D&O) insurance as some of the governance 
mechanisms. Extant studies suggest that monitoring by the institutional owners constrains a 
manager's ability to manage abnormal accruals opportunistically and, hence, improves earnings 
quality (e.g., Mitra and Cready, 2005; Velurya and Jenkins, 2006). Since better quality earnings 
reduce crash risk, research examines the effect of institutional monitoring on crash risk. An and 
Zhang (2013) show that institutional holding by dedicated (transient) investors reduces 
(increases) crash risk. However, they do not show the channel(s) through which both classes of 
institutional shareholding may affect crash risk. In a similar study, Callen and Fang (2013) show 
that institutional investor stability is associated negatively with crash risk. However, in their 
study the moderating role of opacity in affecting crash risk is not convincing, as the interaction 
between opaque financial reporting and institutional stability is largely insignificant.  
 Studying the separation of voting and cash flow rights (excess control) of French listed 
firms, Boubaker, Mansali and Rjiba (2014) report a positive relation between excessive control 
and stock price crashes, which is consistent with their argument that controlling shareholders 
with excessive control tend to withhold bad news in order to cover up their expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ interest. Andreou et al. (2016), on the other hand, find insignificant 
(significant) effects of outside block shareholdings (insider ownership) on crash risk.  
 Financial analysts play an important role in revealing firm-specific information, which 
has valuable implications for crash risk. Using Chinese data, Xu, Chan, Jiang, and Yi (2013) find 
that stock price crash risk increases with an increase in a firm's analyst coverage, and this is more 
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pronounced when analysts are more optimistic, and are affiliated with investment banks and 
brokerage firms.  
It is well-established in the literature that Big audit firms and industry specialist auditors 
play important roles in improving the financial reporting quality and curbing managerial 
incentives to manage earnings for opportunistic purposes (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Krishnan, 2003; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang, 2003). Robin and Zhang 
(2015) find that the information intermediary and corporate governance roles of the auditor 
industry specialization reduce crash risk. They also show the channels (e.g., opacity, accounting 
conservatism, and tax avoidance) through which industry specialist auditors reduce the crash 
risk. Callen and Fang (2016) show that auditor tenure enhances auditors’ client-specific 
knowledge, which reduces future stock price crash risk.  The evidence is consistent with the 
argument that development of client-specific knowledge over audit tenure enhances auditors’ 
ability to detect and deter bad news hoarding activities by clients, thus reducing future crash risk. 
 The D&O insurance, which incorporates D&O insurance underwriters’ forward-looking 
assessment of a company’s litigation likelihood and damage magnitude, can be viewed as a 
continuous, ex ante measure of litigation risk. Firms purchase D&O insurance coverage for 
reimbursement of directors’ and officers’ defense costs and settlements arising from litigation 
(Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011, 2014). Yuan, Sun, and Cao (2016) investigate the effect of 
D&O Insurance on crash risk using data from Chinese listed companies. They argue that D&O 
insurers serve as an external monitoring mechanism, owing to weak corporate governance at 
firm-level and poor investor protection at country-level. As expected, they find a negative 
association between D&O Insurance and crash risk. Their additional tests also show that firms 
purchasing D&O insurance tend to have a low likelihood of financial restatements and great 
25 
 
corporate social responsibility reporting. It is noteworthy that, although this study makes a 
significant improvement in attempting to propose two economic mechanisms through which 
D&O insurance reduces crash risk, the tests are only conducted to establish a link between D&O 
insurance and earnings quality and CSR reporting rather than to test whether the effect of D&O 
insurance on crash risk still holds after controlling for earnings quality and firms’ voluntary 
disclosures.        
Collectively, studies on the effect of corporate governance and external auditing on stock 
price risk via their effect on firms’ financial reporting quality are intuitive and theoretically 
coherent. The findings conform to two streams of literature, including (1) the Corporate 
governance attributes and external monitoring mechanisms that shape financial disclosures and 
reporting quality (Larcker et al., 2007); (2) Jin and Myers’s (2006) theory on bad news hoarding-
induced crash risk, and corresponding empirical evidence that firms with more opaque financial 
reporting are more prone to price crash (e.g., Hutton et al. (2009).  
 
3.7 Non-formal institutions and crash risk 
 
The preceding section summarized the literature on the formal governance mechanism (both 
internal and external) of crash risk. In this section, we review the impact of non-formal 
institutions on crash risk.  
 
3.7.1 Political connections and crash risk 
 
We begin with a recent study that examines the association between political connections and 
crash risk. There remains controversy as to whether political connections are beneficial or 
detrimental to stakeholder interests. Evidence (Fisman, 2001) supporting the beneficial effects of 
26 
 
political connections reveals that such connections enhance firms’ value, among many other 
benefits. On the other hand, studies also show that political connections are harmful to minority 
interests. Empirical research documents that politically connected firms usually undertake high 
rent-seeking activities, e.g., tunnelling (Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 2012; Faccio, 
2006). 
 Lee and Wang (forthcoming)  use data from China and document that the presence of 
politically connected directors accentuates crash risk in listed SOEs, courtesy of appointment of 
local government officials as directors. In contrast, appointment of central-government-affiliated 
directors helps listed privately-controlled firms to reduce crash risk.5 Piotroski, Wong and 
Zhang, (2015) conjecture that political events in China create incentives for listed companies to 
withhold bad news, because politicians and executives of listed companies incur large costs and 
strong penalties for releasing negative news around politically sensitive events. As expected, 
they find that both SOE- and non-SOE listed companies time bad news disclosure strategically, 
showing significantly lower (greater) likelihood of experiencing stock price crash risk before 
(after) two major political events: meeting of the National Congress and provincial-level political 
promotions. The findings highlighting political events stand as a distinct determinant of firms’ 
bad news hoarding behavior. Li and Chan (2016) examine whether Communist Party of China 
(CPC) control affects crash risk. They argue that CPC control can restrain executives from 
hiding bad news and, thus, firms’ information flows to the market become orderly, lowering 
crash risk. The findings support this conjecture, showing that having a CPC committee member 
serving as a director can lower a firm’s crash risk. However, the effect of political intervention is 
a complex issue, and it is far from clear whether political parties’ interference with corporate 
                                                          
5 Central-government-controlled firms have a stronger incentive than local-government-controlled firms to 
pursue shareholder value maximization as is evident, among others, from the requirement for the former to 
adopt earnings-based compensation contracts [Ke, Li & Yuan (forthcoming)].   
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issues is beneficial or detrimental to shareholders’ wealth. For instance, Chang and Wong (2004) 
report that CPC control damages a firm’s accounting performance, but restrains expropriation by 
large shareholders. Due to this complexity, explaining the effect of the CPC from an 
information-hoarding perspective only, as proposed in this paper is insufficient and 
unconvincing. 
 
3.7.2 Religiosity and crash risk 
 
Another informal institution having implications for crash risk is religion. Callen and Fang 
(2016) find that crash risk is lower for firms headquartered in counties in the USA with higher 
levels of religiosity, supporting the argument that religion as a social norm constrains managerial 
bad news hoarding incentives.  The authors propose that “…religious managers are more likely 
to internalize the social norms associated with antimanipulation and so are less likely to 
manipulate the flow of corporate information…[they] also consider the cost in terms of social 
stigma if they are caught violating social norms by manipulating the flow of corporate 
information…” (p. 170). However, the negative association is more pronounced for firms with 
lower ownership by dedicated institutions, with weaker shareholder takeover rights, and for 
riskier firms.  Li & Cai (forthcoming) also examine the effects of religion on crash risk in China. 
An impressive aspect of their research is that they conduct formal tests of the channels through 
which the religion-crash risk relationship could manifest itself. They find that religion indeed 
reduces crash risk, and this occurs primarily through constraints on earnings management and 
perk consumption. Finally, they find that the negative relationship between religion and crash 
risk is more pronounced when the quality of corporate governance, and of the legal environment, 
is higher. This seems counterintuitive, since the role of religion is likely to be stronger where 
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formal institutions are weaker. The authors, however, did not provide any justification for their 
findings. Research on the impact of religion on crash risk considers broader religious beliefs as 
manifested at the state/county level. However, it would be also important to consider the 
individual religious beliefs of the executives (e.g., CFOs) and auditors who are in charge of the 
financial reporting process. It is therefore imperative to investigate whether it is the religious 
beliefs of individuals, or the broader social norm, that plays the pivotal role in constraining the 
bad news hoarding tendency.    
  
3.7.3 Monitoring ability of the regulatory authorities and crash risk  
 
Kubick and Lockhart (2016) examine the effects of SEC oversight on managerial disclosure 
practices having implications for crash risk. They find that firms located farther from the SEC 
headquarters experience greater crash risk. This association is more pronounced for firms with 
more complex financial statements, and when SEC budgets are relatively smaller. This is 
theorized on the notion that managers have subjective estimates regarding the probability of 
being investigated by SEC officials, emanating from their disclosure practices. Managers who 
believe that enforcement of disclosure violations is less likely, due to their office being farther 
away from the SEC, will follow an asymmetric information release policy for negative and 
positive information, hence increasing the probability of crash risk. However this may not be a 
concern for investors if religion plays a constraining role (Callen and Fang, 2016). What happens 
when firms farther from the SEC headquarters operate in counties with higher levels of 
religiosity? How would the result of Kubick and Lockhart (2016) change if religion were used as 





3.7.4 Other non-formal institutions and crash risk 
   
Aman (2013) investigates the associations between media coverage and stock price crashes and 
jumps using data from Japanese stock markets and newspaper articles. The findings suggest that 
media coverage does not affect the price jumps, but has an increasing effect on crashes. This 
crash-inducing effect of media coverage is due to extremely large reactions to information 
distribution among investors as a result of concentrated media coverage. Ben-Nasr, Al-Dahmash 
& Ghouma (2015) examine the influence of labor unionization on crash risk, and find a positive 
association between the two. This finding is consistent with the argument that firms facing strong 
labor unions tend to report lower accounting information, in order to preserve bargaining power 
when negotiating contracts with labor unions. However, the labor union effects on crash risk are 
less pronounced for firms with strong external monitoring mechanisms, e.g., high institutional 
ownership and high analyst coverage. 
 In this section we reviewed an interesting aspect of the determinants of crash risk: the 
impact of informal institutions. Although research abounds on formal governance institutions 
(for example, director, audit and compensation boards), institutional ownership and external 
auditing, literature on the more implicit governance institutions has the potential to offer more 
interesting insights. In particular, it will be important to understand the substitutive, versus the 
complementary, relationships between these two groups of institutions.   
3.8 Financial institutions and crash risk 
 
 
The association between financial reporting opacity and crash risk has also been documented for 
financial institutions. Cohen et al. (2014) find that earnings management (proxied by 
discretionary loan loss provisions and/or by discretionary realizations of security gains or losses) 
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accentuates crash risk for banks during crisis but not during periods of economic boom.  Using 
data from 37 countries, Song, Du and Wu (2016) also find that banks experience lower crash risk 
if their information environment is more transparent. Given the role of the banking sector in 
allocating resources to economies around the world, we suggest more crash-related research for 
financial institutions.  
 Table 2 summarizes the research questions, sample(s) used, and key findings for some 
key research papers on the determinants of crash risk. We also report whether the selected 
studies justified their choice of a particular sample period and explained the economic 
significance of the reported coefficients on the main variable of interest [Dyckman & Zeff (DZ), 
2014]. With respect to the former issue, DZ found only 10 out of the 55 regression papers 
reviewed provided some kind of justification for the selection of the particular sample period. In 
our case, we find 14 out of 28 studies included in Table 2 justify their chosen sample period.  
Although better than that reported by DZ, there is much room for improvement for the present 
and future crash risk researchers to make explicit their rationale for choosing a particular sample 
period.   We also include a column titled “Economic significance of the coefficient of interest”. 
This is very important, since “A statistically significant result is not necessarily an important 
result. Without establishing the economic importance of the result, which requires additional 
work on the part of the researcher, the mathematics reported to date is worthless” (DZ, 2014, p. 
703). We find that 18 out of the 28 studies included in the Table report the economic as well as 
the statistical magnitude of their findings.  
 






4.0 Consequences of crash risk 
 
Although research initiatives designed to understand the causes of crash risk are plentiful, our 
review revealed only two published studies on crash consequences. We find this surprising. 
Following the incidence of crash, which has serious implications for shareholders’ wealth, we 
would expect firms willingly, and/or because of the pressures crated by various stakeholders, to 
take some initiatives to minimize some of the drivers of price crash.6 For example, if earnings 
manipulation is responsible for crash, will there be more effective oversight on the financial 
reporting process by the audit committees during the post-crash period? If CEO and CFO equity 
incentives are responsible for crash risk, would the compensation committee consider 
redesigning compensation schemes? Answers to these questions are not simple. Although equity 
incentives have been identified as a determinant of crash risk (Kim et al., 2011a), it is difficult 
for researchers to control for all other determinants, some of which may well be beyond CEO 
control, e.g., political turmoil. An unintended consequence of reducing equity incentives due to 
crash could lead managers to pass on risky but positive NPV projects.   
 Of the two published papers, An, Li, and Yu  (2015) investigate the impact of crash risk 
on a firm’s speed of leverage adjustment, and how this effect is moderated by the information 
environment. Using data from 41 countries from 1989 to 2013, they show that firms with a 
higher crash-risk exposure slowly adjust their financial leverages toward targets. They also show 
that the negative relation between crash risk and speed of leverage adjustment is less pronounced 
for firms in countries with more transparent financial reporting environments. Hackenbrack, 
Jenkins, and, Pevzner (2014) document a 2 percent increase in clients’ audit fees, ahead of a 
                                                          
6 Although not linked to crash risk, Farber (2005) finds that SCE-alleged fraud firms take actions to improve  
their governance and succeed in doing so, as their governance characteristics become similar to the control 
firms. Farber also finds that the capital market values governance improvement, as firms that take actions to 
improve governance have superior stock price performance.  
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price crash occurring. The finding suggests that a significant portion of the mean increase in 
audit fees is due to an increase in the auditor’s perception of idiosyncratic risk, proxied by crash 
risk.  
 We also searched for working papers on the consequences of price crash, although we 
had not reviewed working papers on the determinants of crash risk. This departure was 
necessitated by a paucity of research on consequences of crash. Wu (2013) documents a positive 
association between current-period crash risk and CEO turnover in the subsequent year, an effect 
which is more pronounced for forced turnover. The findings also suggest that boards of directors 
react by removing CEOs for poor performance: a driver of crash risk. Further research needs to 
document labor market penalties for directors of crash firms as well. Srinivasan (2005) finds that 
in the three years after restatement, director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings 
downward. Since earnings restatement signals lack of monitoring of the financial reporting 
process, which could cause crash risk, future research needs to show that labor market penalties 
exist for directors of crash firms.  
 Another interesting avenue for future research on crash risk consequences would be to 
examine post-crash investment behavior, including CEO risk-taking, in crash firms. If 
overinvestment leads to crash risk, the might then be assumed that firms would adjust their 
investment policies towards the optimum level following a crash. Since research has found that 
overconfident CEOs are more prone to overinvestment compared to their diffident counterparts 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Lin, Hu, and Chen, 2005; Huang, Jiang, Liu, and Zhang, 2011) 
replacing overconfident CEOs post-crash may be an effective remedy. But Goel and Thakor 
(2008) show that in a tournament setting, overconfident managers are more likely to become 
executives because they perceive less risk and therefore take more chances. So failure to find that 
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high removal rates of overconfident CEOs post-crash does not necessarily imply governance 
failure.  
 Taken together, we believe that there is immense potential for future research in the areas 
of crash risk consequences. We have outlined some of the areas where research attention can be 






 In this paper we reviewed the empirical literature on the determinants and consequences 
of stock price crash risk. We categorize the determinants into (i) financial reporting and 
corporate disclosures, (ii) managerial incentives and managerial characteristics, (iii) capital 
market transactions, and (iv) formal and informal corporate governance mechanisms.  
 Managerial incentives for hoarding bad news have been the primary focus of the 
burgeoning literature on crash risk. However, incentives alone would not be sufficient to 
withhold bad news. Managers would have to devise mechanisms for concealing negative 
information. Earnings manipulation (both accruals and real), tax avoidance, and voluntary 
disclosures (CSR disclosures and management earnings guidance) have been identified as some 
of the mechanisms used by managers. Finally, reporting conservatism, external auditing, and 
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. institutional monitoring) can curb managerial 
opportunistic use of mechanisms for concealing negative information.   
 Finally, in terms of country coverage on the determinants of crash risk research, we note 
with no surprise that USA dominates the empirical research followed by China. Although there 
are a couple of international studies, we were surprised to find no published study on either crash 
risk determinants or consequences of crash from other parts of the world. Of course, inferences 
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may be similar for countries with institutional environments similar to the US, e.g. the UK, 
Australia, and Canada; and this may restrain researchers from pursuing research on crash risk in 
other similar institutional settings. Yet it is well known that, despite the institutional similarities, 
similar research questions or some variants thereof have been pursued across these countries. 
Therefore, we call for more research in an international context to better understand the effect of 
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TABLE1: Determinants and consequences of stock price crash risk  
 
Authors  CRASH NCSKEW DUVOL Main IV CRASH NCSKEW DUVOL 
  Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD     
Hutton et al. 
(2009) 
Opacity  0.17 -     OPAQUE 0.855*** 
 
- - 



































Kim et al. 
(2011b) 
 
Tax avoidance  
 










Kim & Zhang 
(2014) 
Implied volatility Descriptive  statistics not reported  OPAQUE 0.005*** IV_SKEW as the dependent  
  variable 
            































IV_SKEW: 0.042 (0.031) FCOM  -0.004*** [Table 2 column 4] 
 




- - -0.285 
 





            




0.195 0.396 -0.072 0.792 -0.141 0.51 REM [DISX] 0.089** 
 
- - 
















Kim et al. Corporate social - - 0.035 0.81 -0.002 0.37 CSR_SCORE - -0.064** -0.027** 
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(2014) responsibility    










Habib & Hasan 
(2016) 
Auditor-provided 
tax services  



















         TRA 1.09*** 
 
1.14***  0.47*** 
 Callen & Fang 
(2015) 


































- - 0.101 0.811 -0.00 0.364 Nine PCF scores from 
21 individual CG 
variables  
- Too many variables to be 
tabled 















 Xu et al. (2014) Excess perks  - - −0.365 0.630 −0.273 0.457 ExcessPerk - 0.247***  0.136*** 
 
Aman (2013) Media Coverage - 0.706 - - - - MEDIA 0.26*** 
 
- - 




- - - - - - PARTY_DIR - -0.061** 
 
- 































He (2015) CEO inside debt - - - - - - InsiDebt -0.1458** 
 
- - 









Piotroski et al. Political - - -0.650 0.674 - - Political - -0.253*** - 
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Callen & Fang 
(2016) 






Li & Cai 
(Forthcoming)  




Zhang et al. 
(2016) 
Donations - - -0.24 0.82 -0.17 0.69 Donations - -0.0024** 
 
-0.0026*** 
       Donations*SOE - 0.0051** 
 
0.0058*** 
 Note: In the following we define those variables which have been used infrequently in the surveyed studies  
 Tax fee ratio (FEERATIO): tax fees received by audit firms as a proportion of audit fees. 
 Incentive ratio (ONEPCT): The dollar change in the value of a manager’s option holdings that would come from a one-percentage-point 
increase in the company stock price.  
 Institutional ownership stability (INSTOWN_Stable): Average standard deviation of institutional shareholding proportions across all 
investors in a firm over a 5-year period including sample year and the 4 years preceding it (i.e., 20 quarters).  
 Dedicated institutional investor (DED) is the percentage of shares outstanding held by dedicated institutions at the end of the year. 
 Transient institutional investor (TRA) is the percentage of shares outstanding held by transient institutions at the end of the year. 
 Short interest (SIR): The number of shares sold short divided by total shares outstanding from the last month of fiscal year t, with a range 
from 0 to 1. Compustat Supplemental Short Interest File provides the available data to calculate short interest. 
 CEO overconfidence (OC_CJRS): Dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO holds options at least twice during the sample period that are 
more than 100 percent in the money, and zero otherwise.  
 CEO overconfidence (OC_SZ): It takes the value of one if the firm meets the requirements of at least three of the following five criteria 
and zero otherwise: (i) Excess investment is in the top quartile within industry years; (ii) net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows 
are in the top quartile within industry-years; (iii) the debt-to equity ratio is in the top quartile within industry-years; (iv) either convertible 
debt or preferred stock is greater than zero; and (v) the dividend yield is zero. 
 Religion (RELIGION) (Li & Cai, Forthcoming): The distance between the registered address of the listed company and the site of 
religious activity.  
 Religion (REL) (Callen & Fang 2015): Religiosity data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). Once every decade, the 
Glenmary Research Center collects data from surveys on religious affiliation in the United States (1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000). Based on 
the survey results, the center reports county-level data on the number of churches and the number of total adherents by religious affiliation. 
 Political connection (PCON): Number of politically connected directors on the board divided by the total number of directors. A board 
member as a politically connected director if he or she formerly (currently) served (serves) in one of the following posts: (1) government 
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official, (2) member of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC), (3) member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), or (4) military official.   
 Media coverage (MEDIA): Iinformation from Nikkei Telecom 21 on the number of citations over one year in four commercial 
newspapers, The Nikkei, the Nikkei Business Daily, the Nikkei Finance Journal, and the Nikkei Marketing Journal. 
 Annual report readability (log(File size): The natural logarithm of the file size in megabytes of the SEC EDGAR “complete submission 
text file” for the 10-K filing. 
 Excess perks (ExcessPerk): Actual perk consumption minus expected perk consumption whereby the latter is derived by regressing perks 
consumption (scaled by revenue) on natural log of total compensation for all firm employees, firm size, and the natural log of total income 
per capita of the region in which the firm is located.  
 Communist party control (CPC): A dummy variable coded 1 if any members of the CPC committee are also directors, supervisors, or 
senior executives; otherwise it is zero. 
 Inside debt (InsiDebt): A dummy variable,  which takes value of 1 if CEO relative leverage exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise (See Appendix 2 of 
the paper for the detailed calculation of CEO leverage).  
 Proximity to the SEC (SEC distance): The distance between the firm’s headquarters and the closest SEC regional or national office. SEC 
national office in Washington DC and regional offices in New York City, Miami, Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles. 
 Stock liquidity (LIQ): -100 times relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the difference between the trade price and the midpoint of 
the bid-ask quote over the trade price.  
 Political incentives (Political and Post-Political): An indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event 
(i.e., National Congress or Provincial-Level Political Promotion), zero otherwise. An indicator variable equal to one in the year 
immediately following the political event, zero otherwise. 
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TABLE2: Determinants of stock price crash risk  
Authors Research question Sample Sample period 
justification 
Findings Economic significance of 
the coefficient of interest  
 
Financial reporting quality, bad news hoarding and crash risk 
 
Hutton et al. 
(2009) 




on crash risk. 
1991-2005 
sample 




Direct method CF 
data because first 
available in 1987. 
Sample periods begin 
in 1991 as three 
annual lags of cash 
flow data is needed 
for estimating 
accruals. 
Firms with opaque financial statements 
are more prone to stock price crashes. 
However, this relation more is 
pronounced before the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Financial reporting opacity 
accounts for 15.8% of the 
variation in crash risk. 
      
Francis et al. 
(2014) 
To examine the 
impact of real 
earnings 
management on 








No justification for 
sample period. 
Firms that deviate in real operations  
from industry norms are positively 
associated with future crash risk. 
One standard deviation 
change around the mean of 
3 years’ absolute value of 
deviation in real operations 
increases crash likelihood 
by 0.94 % 














No justification for 
the start of sample 
period in 1962. 
Conditional conservatism reduces the 
likelihood of a firm experiencing future 
price crashes. Furthermore, changes in 
the degree of conditional conservatism 
are also negatively associated with 
changes in future crash risk. 
A one standard deviation 
increase in the Basu (1997) 
coefficient reduces crash 
probability by 46.4%. 
Kim et al. 
(2011b) 
To examine the 
association between 
tax avoidance and 







To ensure the 
consistent 
measurement of tax 
avoidance variables, 
following the 
enactment of FAS 
109, Accounting for 
Income Taxes, the 
authors start sample 
Various forms of tax avoidance increase 
crash risk.  
Logistic regression revels 
that the marginal effect of 
the tax avoidance measure 
on crash risk is 3.6%for 
SHELTER, 4.1% for 
LRETR, and 3.1% for 
BTDFACTOR. Economic 
significance for tax 
avoidance variable for two 
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period in 1995. other crash risk measures is 
not reported.  
Zhu (2016) Investigates the 
relation between 
accruals and price 
crashes.  







None provided A strong positive association between 
total accruals and price crashes is found 
which is consistent with the hidden bad 
news explanation. With respect to the  
components of accruals, Zhu (2016) 
finds that less (more) reliable accrual 
components are significantly positively 
(not significantly)  associated with price 
crashes,  
The probability of 
observing price over the 
next year increases from 
12.88 % for the lowest 
decile of the current year’s 
accruals to 
17.27 % for the highest 
decile. 
      
Kim et al. 
(2014) 
To examine the 
effect of CSR 








Availability of CSR 
data from 1994 from 
KLD database and use 
of one year lagged 
value allow the 
authors to begin the 
sample period from 
1995. 
Firms with better CSR scores are less 
prone to crash risk. The role of CSR in 
reducing stock price crash risk is 
particularly important when internal 
monitoring by the boards or external 
monitoring by institutional investors is 
weak. 
On average, an increase of 
one standard deviation 
in CSR_SCORE is 
associated with a decrease 
of 0.052 in NCSKEW in 
year t. DUVOL, too, is 
economically significant.  
      
Ertrugrul et al. 
(Forthcoming) 
Examines the 
effects of annual 
report readability 
and tone ambiguity 
on crash risk and  
borrowing costs 







None provided Firms with larger reports and a higher 
proportion of uncertain and weak 
expressions experience greater crash 
risk supporting the argument that 
readability of a firm’s financial 
disclosures are related to managerial 
information hoarding. 
A one SD increase in 
readability score would 
lead to an 18.2% increase 
in the average value of 
NCskew 




proximity to SEC 
(‘geography of 
crash risk’) impacts 
crash risk 




from 1996 to 
2012 
YES. “…sample 
begins in 1996 [to] 
obtain historical zip 
codes from firm 10-K 
filings…” 
Firms further away from SEC office are 
more likely to experience crash. This 
effect is more pronounced for firms 
with larger 10-K file sizes. This is 
consistent with managerial influence 
over annual report disclosures with an 
intent to obfuscate bad news when there 
is greater distance between managers 
and the SEC.  
A change from 1st to the 3rd 
quartile of the distance 
from SEC variable 





External monitoring and crash risk 














No justification for 
the sample period. 
Information intermediary and corporate 
governance roles of auditor industry 
specialization reduce crash risk. 
Moreover, industry-specialist auditors 
moderate the effects of opacity, 
accounting conservatism, and tax 
avoidance on crash risk. 
No 
      
Habib & Hasan 
(2016) 
To investigate the 
association between 








Sample period begins 
from 2002 as 
Congress ratified 
SOX in this year. 
NATS attenuate crash risk by 
constraining both tax expenses 
management and tax avoidance. 
Further, NATS reduce crash risk for 
firms following innovative business 
strategies. Empirical findings, therefore, 
support knowledge spillover benefits.  
No 
      
Callen and Fang 
(2013) 












No justification for 
the sample period. 
Institutional investor stability is 
negatively associated with one-year-
ahead stock price crash risk. Moreover, 
this relationship varies depending on  
whether institutional owners are public 
pension funds or bank trusts, investment 
companies and independent investment 
advisors. 
One year ahead crash risk 
increase by 5.3% with a 
shift from the 25th 
to the 75th percentile of the 
distribution of standard 
deviation of institutional 
shareholding. 
      
An and Zhang 
(2013) 
To examine the 
impact of 
institutional 
investors on stock 
price synchronicity 








Sample period begins 
from 1987 as the 
historical SIC data is 
missing in Compustat 
before 1987. 
Monitoring by dedicated institutional 
investors mitigates managerial bad-
news hoarding, which reduces crash risk 
and stock price synchronicity 
A one-standard deviation 
increase of dedicated 
institutional ownership will 
lead to an 17%  decrease in 
crash risk at the mean, 
while a similar increase of 
transient institutional 
investors  will increase 




      






crash risk  






Sample period begins 





listed firms to report 
the identity of the 
ultimate controller in 
the annual report from 
2003. 
Politically connected directors 
accentuates crash risk in listed SOEs 
courtesy of appointment of local 
government officials as directors. In 
contrast, appointment of central-
government-affiliated directors, helps 
listed privately controlled firms to 
reduce crash risk. The presence of good 
quality institutions does not help to 
attenuate the adverse effect of political 
connections on crash risk for listed 
SEOs.  
Economic significance not 
explained  
 
Internal corporate governance mechanism and stock price crash risk 
 
Andreou et al. 
(2016) 
To examine the 
association between  
corporate 
governance systems 









No justification for 
the sample period. 
Stock price crashes are positively 
associated with institutional ownership 
and financial reports opacity, while 
negatively associated with percentage of 
independent directors on the audit 
committee and auditor industry 
expertise and clearly defined corporate 
governance policy. 
A change in the corporate 
governance measures from 
the 25th to 75th percentile 
explains  from 23.01% to 
29.48% of the standard 
deviation of the crash risk. 
      
Kim, Li, and 
Zhang (2011) 
To examine the 
relative contribution 
of CEO versus 
CFO’s equity 
incentives for future 







No justification for 
the sample period. 
CFO’s equity incentives are positively 
related to the firm’s future crash risk.  
This association is more pronounced for 
CFOs and in firms operating in non-
competitive industries and those with a 
high level of financial leverage. 
No 
      
Kim et al.  
(2014) 












No justification for 
the sample period. 
Overconfident CEOs are associated 
with higher stock price crash risk, an 
association which is pronounced if the 
CEO is more dominant among the top 
management team. 
Firms with overconfident 
CEOs are associated with 
1.2% to 3.6% more crash 










To investigate the 
association between 
internal control 
quality and stock 
price crash risk 










The internal control 
index covers Chinese 
listed firms from 2007 
to 2012. 
Internal control is negatively associated 
with price crash, and this negative 
relation is more pronounced in firms 
with weak governance (i.e. non-Big 4 
auditors, located in provinces with low 
market development, and less 
conservative accounting) and with poor 
ability to mitigate impacts of extreme 
negative events (i.e. non-state-owned 
enterprises). 
It is estimated that when 
internal control quality 
increases from the first to 
the third quartile, the crash 
risk proxy NCSKEW 
decreases by 0.034, which 
is 19.73% of the median 
value of NCSKEW. 
      
He (2015) Examines the 
effects of CEO 








from 2006 to 
2011  
Starting from 
December 15, 2006, 
the SEC required 
public firms to 
disclose detailed 
information about the 
computation and 
value of executive 
pension benefits and 
deferred 
compensation.  
CEO inside debt holdings reduce firm-
specific stock price crash risk. 
A one SD increase 
in InsiDebt decreases the 
incidence of a stock price 
crash by 3.1 % points, 
which accounts for 15.38 % 
of the sample mean of 
Crash. 
 
Prediction of crash risk 
      
Chen et al. 
(2001) 
To forecast 
skewness in the 
daily returns 







Sample period begins 
in 1962 as trading 
volume data is 
available from this 
period. 
Stock price crash is most pronounced 
for firms with an increase in trading 
volume relative to trend over the prior 
six months and stock with positive 
returns over the prior 36 months. 
A two-standard-deviation 
shock to DTURNOVER 
translates into a movement 














for the years 
1981 to 2011. 
Short interest 
information is 
available from 1981 
One-year ahead stock price crash risk is 
positively associated with short interest. 
This positive association is more 
pronounced for firms with weak 
governance monitoring mechanisms, 
excessive risk taking behavior, and high 
information asymmetry. 
A change in the short 
interest from the 25th to 
75th percentile explains on 
average 12.25% of the 
sample-mean across 
alternative measures of 
crash risk. 
 
Informal institutions and crash risk 
      
Callen & Fang 
(2015) 
To investigate the 
effects of religion 




1971 to 2000. 
Although not 
explicitly stated, the 
data source, i.e., 
Glenmary Research 
Center collects data 
from surveys on 
religious affiliation 
once in a decade.  
Firms headquartered in counties with 
higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower 
levels of future stock price crash risk 
consistent with the view that religion, as 
a set of social norms, helps to curb bad-
news-hoarding activities by managers. 
This negative association is more 
pronounced for riskier firms and for 
firms with weaker governance 
mechanisms.  
A shift from the 25th to the 
75th percentiles of the 
distribution of religiosity 
reduces crash risk by 
6.34% (NCSKEW), 4.85% 
(DUVOL), and 3.78% 
(CRASH)  
      
Cai & Li (2016) To investigate the 
effects of religion 









Companies headquartered in provinces 
with more religious activities 
experiences less crash risk. The negative 
relationship manifests through religions 
effect on constraining earnings 
management and perk consumption. 
Finally, the negative relationship is 
stronger with better corporate 
governance and strong legal regime.  
No 
      
Xu et al. (2014) Excess perks  A sample of 
Chinese 
SOEs from 
2003 to 2010. 
There were sufficient 
number of firms 
that voluntarily 
disclosed their perk 
expenses from 2003 
and beyond and it was 
also the first year with 
Motivated by the intention to enjoy 
excess perks, executives in state-owned 
enterprises withhold bad news for 
extended periods, leading to higher 






      






No. Intensive media reports on a firm 
provoke extremely large reactions in the 
market to corporate news.  
An increase of one standard 
deviation in lnMEDIA 
generates a 0.082 s.d. 
increase in CRASH 
SHARE [1%] and the 
normalized effect of 
lnMEDIA [Others] is a 
0.224 s.d. increase. 




A sample of 
Chinese 
SOEs from 
2003 to 2012,  
No justification 
provided 
Having a CPC committee member 
serves as a director can lower a firm’s 
crash risk.  
No.  
      




A sample of 
Chinese 
listed firms 
from 2002 to 
2012. 
2002 is chosen as the 
beginning year of the 
sample period 
because the first D&O 
insurance appeared in 
that year. 
D&O insurance in China is negatively 
associated with stock price crash risk, 
and this effect is more pronounced in 
firms with lower board independence, 
non-Big 4 auditors, lower institutional 
shareholdings, and weaker investor 
protection. 
No. 
      
Piotroski et al. 
(2013) 





1993 to 2011. 
No. Listed firms experience a reduction in 
negative stock return skewness before 
two visible political events including 
meetings of the National Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party and high-













Chen, Khurana, & Zheng 
(2014),   
Cash flow opacity and stock price crash risk: Cheng et al. (2014) find that CFO opacity provides incremental 
explanatory power for crash risk beyond accruals-based earnings opacity. This adverse impact is less pronounced for 
firms with analyst cash flow forecasts, firms near financial distress, and firms with long-term issuer credit ratings. 
Amadeus & Sadka 
(2015) 
Executive compensation convexity and firm crash risk: Executive compensation convexity, measured as the 
sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts firm specific crashes. A bottom-to-
top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm’s crash risk. 
Kim, Wang, & Zhang 
(2015) 
Readability of 10-K Reports and stock price crash risk: Using the Fog Index as the measure of readability of 
annual reports, the authors find that more complex reports lead to greater crash risk. This finding implies that strategic 
disclosures in the form of less readable financial reports allow managers to withhold adverse information. Additional 
tests reveal that the positive association is stronger for firms with (persistent) negative earnings news, for firms with 
low litigation risk but with more CEO equity incentives, and during both the pre and post-SOX periods. 
Dang, Lee, Liu, and  
Zeng (2016) 
Does debt maturity affect stock price crash risk: Dang et al. (2016) find that firms with a larger proportion of short-
term debt experience lower crash risk, implying that short-maturity debt acts as a monitoring mechanism on 
managerial bad news hoarding behavior. The study also finds a substitutive relationship between short-maturity debt 
and other governance mechanisms. 
Hamm, Li, & Ng (2016) Earnings guidance, bias, and stock price crash risk: Hamm et al. (2016) find that management earnings guidance 
(one type of voluntary disclosure) increases crash risk, and this is more pronounced for firms with higher executive 
stock ownership, weaker external monitoring, lower litigation risk, more upward-biased forecasts, and more opaque 
earnings. 
Jeong-Bon Kim, Yeung 
& Zhou (2013) 
Material weakness in internal control and stock price crash risk: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosure: 
Kim et al. (2013) find that in general, firms with ICW are more prone to price crash than firms without such problem 
and the crash risk is greater if firms’ ICW is fraud-related. More importantly, the authors find that the increase in crash 
risk started two years before the disclosure of adverse opinion of firms’ internal control is made, but it gradually 
reduces after ICW disclosure and eventually disappears if remediation of internal control is undertaken by firms.  
Liu (2015) Do executives have fixed effects on firm-level stock price crash risks: Liu finds that both individual CEOs and 
CFOs are associated with the cross-sectional variation in most of the crash risk proxies used. The CEO /CFO fixed 
effects were found to be related to fixed managerial ability (the portion of managerial ability attributed to each 
switching manager from the ability measure developed by Demerjian 2012). 
Hu, Jeong-Bon Kim & 
Zhang (2016) 
Insider trading and stock price crash risk: International Evidence from a Natural Experiment: Using an 
international sample, Hu et al. (2013) find that the initial insider trading law enforcement leads to a significant 




Wang (2012)  Overvaluation, financial opacity and crash risk: Wang (2012) finds that overvalued firms tend to use more earnings 
management (higher financial opacity) and they do so to conceal firm specific information from the investors resulting 
in greater higher crash risk than otherwise identical but non-overvalued firms.  
Deng, Gao, & Kim 
(2016) 
The pathogen, scapegoat, or a miracle drug? Short selling and stock price crash risk: Employing the difference-
in-differences approach and a regulatory change from the SEC, as an exogenous shock, they find that the lifting of 
short-sale constraints reduces the stock price crash risk. The beneficial effect is stronger for firms with more severe 
agency problems and greater information asymmetry.  
Luo & Ren (not dated) Short sale, margin purchase, and stock price crash risk: Results of difference in different tests reveal that the 
removal of bans on short-sale and margin-purchase is followed by a reduction in stock price crash risk over the 
subsequent six months in China.  
Habib & Hasan (2016) Business strategy, overvalued equities, and stock price crash risk: Using a composite strategy score developed by 
Bentley, Omer and Sharp (2013), the authors document that firms following innovative business strategies 
(prospectors) are more prone to future crash risk than defenders. Further, prospectors are more prone to equity 
overvaluation which, in turn, increases future crash risk.    
Hamers, Renders, and 
Vost (2016) 
Firm life cycle and stock price crash risk: Hamers et al. (2016) document that crash risk is highest in the 
introduction and growth stage due probably to heterogeneity in investor beliefs and investor overoptimism. They 
further document that growth-stage firms without short interest are subject to greater crash risk than growth-stage firms 
with short interest.  
Kim, Luo, & Xie (2016) Dividend payments and stock price crash risk: Dividends payments reduce crash risk because (i) firms paying 
dividends have better quality earnings (ii) are more likely to access external capital market and thus are subject to 
external monitoring, and (iii) and are constrained from overinvestment in pet projects courtesy of the more free cash 
flows (FCF).   
Dang, Faff, Luong, & 
Nguyen (2016) 
National culture and stock price crash risk: Using an international sample, the authors find that firms headquartered 
in countries that promote strong individualism (are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty avoidance) are more 
(less) likely to experience stock price crash risk. The findings, therefore, suggest that individualism encourages 
managerial bad-news hoarding whereas uncertainty avoidance curbs such behavior. 
Not known Gender on corporate boards and crash risk:  A positive relationship is found between females on boards appointed 
for the first time and crash. But a negative association between the presence of females on boards for a longer period 
and crash.  
Chen, Kim, & Yao 
(2015) 
Earnings smoothing and stock price crash risk: A higher degree of earnings smoothing is associated with greater 
crash risk; however, this association is less pronounced for firms with more analyst following and higher institutional 
shareholdings. Stock price crash risk increases when earnings smoothing is accompanied by cumulative positive 
discretionary accruals. 
Boehme, Fotak, & May 
(2016) 
Crash risk and seasoned equity offerings: The issuance of seasoned equity is associated with future stock price crash 
risk. The association between seasoned equity offerings and crash risk is stronger among offerings that involve the sale 
of secondary shares.  In analyses of open market insider trading prior to crashes, the authors find that net selling by 
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CEOs and CFOs is abnormally high in years succeeded by crashes relative to years not succeeded by crashes and is 
especially high among seasoned equity issuers that subsequently crash.  
Li & Zhan (2016) Product market threats and stock crash risk:  Competitive pressure from the product market causes a firm to 
withhold negative information. Using fluidity as the main measure of product market threats, they find that firms 
facing more threats are more prone to stock crashes. This result is confirmed by an instrumental variable analysis and a 
difference-in-difference analysis with exogenous shock to market competition. 
Firth, Wong, & Zhou 
(2015) 
Corporate accessibility, private communications and stock price crash risk: stock price crash risk of accessible 
firms (based on their responses to outsiders’ attempted communications with them) is lower than that of non-accessible 
firms, with the results being more pronounced when public information environment is opaque. Furthermore, 
accessible firms’ crash risk declines less when short-selling constraints are removed, have lower market synchronicity, 
and have more corporate site visits made by market participants. 
Wang (2012) Does the balance sheet prevent managers from hiding bad news? Evidence from firm-specific crash risk: Using 
net operating assets scaled by total assets (𝑁𝑂𝐴) as a proxy for balance sheet bloat, Wang (2012) find a positive 
association between the two but during the pre-SOX regime. The relationship becomes negative in the post-SOX 
period. 𝑁𝑂𝐴’s predicative power has largely dissipated since the passage of SOX.  
Andreou, Cooper, 
Louca, & Philip (2016) 
Bank loan loss accounting treatments, credit cycles and crash risk: Conditional conservatism accounting reduces 
the crash risk of small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom, but that for large banks the risk of stock 
price crashes is not reduced by more conservative accounting, even for those with higher levels of opacity.  
Xu, Jing, Chan, & Wu 
(not dated) 
Analyst herding and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China: Xu et al. find that firms with disproportionately 
more analysts herding, have higher future stock price crash risk.  The positive relation between analyst herding 
behavior and future stock price crash risk is more pronounced when firms have higher information asymmetry.  
Further, we find that analyst herding behavior is not related to positive stock price jumps, suggesting that analysts do 
not hold back good news for a firm. 
Chen, Zhang, & Zhang 
(2015) 
CEO duality and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China: CEO duality increases crash risk in China. The 
relationship is more pronounced for firms with high information asymmetry, namely those with relatively higher R&D 
expenditure, higher advertising expenditure, lower product market competition, and lower analyst coverage. 
Mamun,  Balachandran, 
& Duong (2016) 
Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk: Firms with powerful CEOs experience greater crash. The impact of 
earnings management, tax avoidance, CFO option incentives and CEO overconfidence on crash is more pronounced 
for firms with powerful CEOs. The takeover index, proxy for corporate governance engendered by legal environment, 
mitigate stock price crash for firms with non-powerful CEOs, however, has no impact for firms with founder CEOs. 
Product market competition does not attenuate the positive impact of CEO power on crash.  
Bao, Fung & Su (2015) Can shareholders be at rest after adopting clawback provisions? Evidence from stock price crash risk: Stock 
price crash risk increases after firms voluntarily adopt clawback provisions in managers’ compensation contract. Total 
upward (but not downward) earnings management increases for clawback adopters, and the increase in crash risk is 
driven by firms with more income-increasing total earnings management after adopting clawback provisions. In 
addition, the positive association between clawback adoption and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with low 
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institutional holdings and with high equity incentive for CEOs. 
Callen, Fang, Xin & 
Zhang (2014) 
Knowledge advantage and stock price crash risk: Evidence from the office size of engagement auditors: They 
examine the effects of the office size of the local engagement auditor on future price crash. They document a negative 
association between the two suggesting that large audit offices are better able to detect and deter bad news hoarding 
activities through knowledge advantage than their smaller counterparts. The negative association is more pronounced 
for firms with better shareholder protection consistent with the interaction of audit incentives, induced by governance 
mechanisms, and engagement office ability in mitigating crash risk. 
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